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Abstract 
Based on a dataset of party candidates from 488 party lists for seven 
elections of the Belgian Lower House (1987-2010), this contribution 
analyzes the effects of district magnitude, gender representation and 
candidate selection methods on the level of geographical 
representation on party lists. The results show that higher district 
magnitude leads to more dominant large municipality candidates on 
realistic list positions. Decentralized and inclusive candidate selection 
methods, however, increase the number of municipalities on the list 
and, as a result, the overall inclusiveness of party lists. Finally, a 
higher number of candidate list slots guarantees the inclusion of 
geographic minority candidates, but also strengthens the dominance of 
large municipality candidates on realistic positions. 
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1. Introduction 
The focus of this paper is on the geographical representativeness of party lists. It examines 
which party- and electoral system-related attributes explain the variation in that response 
variable. By doing so, this contribution seeks to improve our understanding of the 
geographical consequences of intraparty candidate selection. 
Electoral systems are often evaluated on the basis of their ability to translate election results 
into legislatures that reflect the composition of society. In proportional systems, we expect 
vote shares to be accurately translated into seat shares. In addition, members of parliament 
should also be a representative sample of society, for instance in terms of gender, ethnicity, 
age and geography. This argument stems from the theory of descriptive representation, which 
posits that a political institution must mirror the image of society to be viewed as legitimate 
by all segments of society (Pitkin, 1967; Birch, 1993). While descriptive representation is not 
without its critics, it has been a popular approach in empirical studies on the representation of 
minority groups (Norris and Lovenduski, 1995; Phillips, 1995; Cotta and Best, 2000). 
Of the personal traits mentioned in the previous paragraph, the geography of MPs and 
candidates is definitely one of the under-researched topics. By contrast, scholars have 
extensively studied the representation of women and ethnic minorities in parliaments (Htun, 
2004; Norris, 2004). Moreover, it has been well-documented why parties in proportional 
systems are inclined to balance their ticket to include women and ethnic minority groups 
among their candidates (Matland, 1993; Salmond, 2006). With regard to the geographical 
background of MPs and candidates, we only know that the large majority of electoral systems 
work with electoral districts to ensure geographical representation in parliament. There has 
been, however, surprisingly little attention on how political parties deal with geographical 
representation or geographic ticket-balancing on their party lists. 
Latner and McGann (2005) demonstrated that even electoral systems with a single national 
constituency produce geographically representative parliaments. While it was clear that 
political parties played an important role in the process, it has not been examined how those 
parties achieved that result. Some authors claim that their internal candidate selection methods 
recognize the importance of regionalism, and force the party selectorates to produce 
geographically representative party lists (Koole and Leijenaar, 1988; Hazan, 1997). 
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This paper attempts to shed more light on the determinants of geographical representation on 
party lists. The question I try to tackle, is the following: which electoral system-related and 
party-related variables influence this outcome at the district (i.e. party list) level? A dataset 
was built on the place of residence of candidates on 488 party lists for seven elections of the 
Belgian Lower House (1987-2010). Three measures of geographical representation at the 
party list level were constructed, and will be used as outcome variables in the empirical 
analysis. Concerning independent variables, multiple measures of district magnitude are 
included as electoral system-variables, and the level of inclusiveness and decentralization in 
the candidate selection process as party-related variables. Additionally, the level of gender 
representation on party lists was measured to examine whether it is a strong predictor of other 
forms of representation on the list.  
Belgium is a case where geography is strongly embedded in the political culture: it is a federal 
system combining territorial and non-territorial substate levels, with separate party systems 
and strong regional identities. Therefore, it is an interesting case to analyze geographical 
consequences of candidate selection methods. In addition, recent electoral reforms have 
significantly increased district magnitude and the level of gender representation through the 
introduction of quota laws, creating variation in key independent variables mentioned in the 
literature. 
2. A general theory of ticket-balancing 
Ticket-balancing implies that parties present a balanced group of candidates in terms of their 
background characteristics. With regard to the geographical background of candidates, this 
means that party selectorates nominate candidates from various areas in the district, instead of 
a geographically more concentrated group. If this is indeed a primary concern for parties, the 
place of residence of aspirant-candidates becomes one of the candidate selection criteria.  
However, the importance of balancing tickets depends on the electoral system type and 
district magnitude, defined as the number of seats per district (Matland, 2005). In majoritarian 
systems, where district magnitude usually equals one, parties do not even have the chance to 
balance their ticket. They nominate only one candidate, and pursue the strategy of selecting a 
lowest common denominator (Tremblay, 2012), i.e. that particular candidate with the broadest 
electoral appeal. This maximizes the odds of winning a majority of votes and consequently 
the seat. In proportional systems, on the other hand, district magnitude is considerably higher, 
and parties could win multiple seats in the district. In other words, party magnitude (defined 
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as the number of seats a party wins in the district) increases, which implies that parties are 
able to divide their winning slots or realistic list positions among candidates from various 
social groups.  
Parties in proportional systems thus have the theoretical possibility to balance their ticket, but 
will also be inclined to actually do so for both electoral and organisational reasons (Gallagher 
and Marsh, 1988; Norris, 2004; Valdini, 2012). From an electoral perspective, the exclusion 
of any major social group could signal discrimination, which could result into an electoral 
penalty at the ballot box (Norris, 2006). The ticket-balancing strategy also makes sense from a 
party cohesion perspective: balancing the slate also avoids internal conflict between party 
factions (Norris, 1997). 
The ticket-balancing process is often considered a crucial factor affecting women’s presence 
in parliaments and on party lists (Matland and Studlar, 1996). But the exact nature of this 
process, and the actual number of women getting elected, depends on the configuration of 
three elements: ballot structure, district and party magnitude. First, ballot structure determines 
which part of the candidate lists should be balanced to guarantee the election of women 
candidates. In closed list systems, where the specific rank order of candidates on the list 
determines who gets elected, parties have to put women in one of the top positions on the list 
(Marsh, 2005). In open list proportional systems, only the voters decide who will get elected 
by casting preference votes for one or more candidates on the list. In this case, the specific 
position of women candidates on the list is less important (see however: Miller and Krosnick, 
1988). Finally, in the more hybrid list PR systems where both the rank order and the number 
of preference votes come into play (e.g. flexible list systems), it is important to have female 
candidates in winning slots as well as a reasonable number of women on the list in its entirety.  
Second, the higher the district magnitude, the higher the absolute number of list slots and thus 
the available space to present a balanced group of candidates (Carey and Shugart, 1995; see, 
however: Crisp et al., 2007).  A long list of candidates allows parties to include all relevant 
social groups on the ballot. After all, while the majority of the existing literature deals with 
the effects of ticket-balancing on the representation of women, this mechanism also increases 
the representation of other groups, such as ethnic minorities (Lovenduski and Norris, 1993; 
Norris, 1997). The third and final element, party magnitude, determines whether these groups 
have a realistic chance of getting elected to parliament. If a party expects to win only one seat 
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in the district, the candidate selection process becomes a ‘winner takes all’ event, thereby 
making ticket-balancing purely cosmetic (Young, 1994). 
While this discussion of the ticket-balancing process largely focused on gender 
representation, I argue that the same mechanisms work for geographical representation. 
Higher district and party magnitude increases the chances of seeing candidates from both 
urbanized and rural areas on the party list and elected to parliament. The latter category could 
then be regarded as the geographic minority group. 
But even in the most ideal institutional setup, there is no absolute guarantee that parties will 
actually balance their ticket. In fact, some parties might still prefer to nominate a very 
homogenous group of candidates, without actually getting electorally punished or creating 
intraparty turmoil. If those parties’ electoral support is largely concentrated in one social 
group, it will be less inclined to balance the ticket. Ethnic parties, for example, will mainly 
draw candidates from their own ethnic minority group since they are not interested in drawing 
support from other social groups (Holmsten et al., 2010). Mainstream parties, on the contrary, 
draw support from various social groups and will be more inclined to balance their ticket. 
Applying this argument to geographical representation means that parties with geographically 
concentrated support will be less likely to produce geographically balanced tickets. Parties 
with geographically dispersed support, however, will put some effort in selecting candidates 
from various areas. In the next section, I derive a number of independent variables from the 
literature, and discuss their expected effects on the level of geographical representation on 
party lists. 
3. Independent variables and hypotheses 
District magnitude has already been discussed as an important predictor for the level of 
representation in parliaments and on party lists. In general, district magnitude is positively 
correlated with both the number of list slots and party magnitude, which means that both list 
space and multiple winning slots are available to get candidates from various social groups 
elected to parliament. The literature states that minority groups will have higher levels of 
political representation in larger districts (Matland, 1993; Salmond, 2006). 
In terms of geographical representation, this would imply that district magnitude has a 
positive effect on the representation of geographic minority groups. I argue that candidates 
from small municipalities perform the minority role. In general, party selectorates will be 
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more inclined to nominate candidates from the larger and middle-sized municipalities of the 
district: those candidates share their place of residence with a larger proportion of voters 
which makes them electorally more attractive, and they resort on more resourceful grassroots 
organizations than candidates from the smallest municipalities. But this latter group does 
stand a chance of getting nominated in the largest districts: as district magnitude (DM) 
increases, parties will be more willing to allocate (realistic) list positions to geographical 
minority groups. This leads to the first hypothesis of this paper: 
An increase in DM leads to more proportional and inclusive representation of municipalities 
on party lists (H1). 
As mentioned earlier, even in electoral systems with favorable conditions for balanced tickets, 
one might encounter parties with no interest in ticket-balancing efforts. But among parties that 
do have such an interest, however, there will still be considerable variation in terms of effort 
and success. One might argue that we could measure these party efforts by using one form of 
social group representation as a predictor of another form. Put differently, if a party scores 
higher in terms of the representation of women, one might expect they also perform better in 
terms of geographic minority group representation.  
This argument stems from a strong claim in the literature that levels of representation in one 
form are a good indicator of the levels of representation in the other (Taagepera, 1994; 
Lijphart, 1999). This is based on the idea that the same factors contribute to higher levels of 
gender and ethnic representation, mainly the electoral system in place, candidate supply and 
cultural factors (Dahlerup, 2013; Paxton and Kunovich, 2003; Reynolds, 2006). While these 
authors focus on parliamentary representation, this association might also hold true for party 
lists. Controlling for the electoral system type and district magnitude, the level of 
inclusiveness on party lists in terms of gender representation might be positively associated 
with inclusiveness in terms of geographical representation. In other words, if party 
selectorates invest in representational politics and find it important to reflect society on party 
lists, geographical representation will go hand in hand with the presence of female candidates: 
The levels of gender and geographical representation on party lists are positively correlated 
(H2a). 
There has not been a lot of convincing empirical evidence for this argument. Based on a 
dataset comprising 95 countries, Ruedin (2010) found no positive association between levels 
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of gender and ethnic group representation. However, the author did not find a negative 
correlation either, indicating that it is not the case that increasing levels of representation in 
one form might come at the cost of another. One could, however, make the argument that it 
does: strong fixation on the representation of one social group may impede the representation 
of others. The literature on intersectionality points to the tensions that may be involved in the 
representation of gender and minority groups (Dovi, 2002). Holmsten et al. (2010) find that 
particularly the parties appealing to a religious minority tend to elect fewer women. Similar 
results were found in the cases of Arab and ultra-Orthodox parties in the Israeli Knesset 
(Rahat and Malka, 2012).  As a result, an alternative hypothesis is formulated: 
The levels of gender and geographical representation on party lists are negatively correlated 
(H2b). 
Another relevant covariate is the nature of the parties’ candidate selection methods. The most 
useful analytical framework for comparative analysis of candidate selection methods has been 
developed by Hazan and Rahat (2001; 2006; 2010). Their model disentangles four dimensions 
of candidate selection, among which selectorate and decentralization are the most important. 
The selectorate, on the one hand, is the body that selects the candidates, and can be composed 
of only one person, or several people, up to the entire electorate of the nation. This dimension 
can be measured on a continuum from inclusive selectorates, where a very limited group of 
selectors take control, to exclusive selectorates, such as the party members or the electorate. 
Decentralization, on the other hand, measures the extent to which local selectorates can 
nominate party candidates.i In the most centralized methods, the national party level has 
complete control over the nomination process. 
There has been some research attention to the effect of candidate selection methods on 
political representation (Hazan, 1999; Rahat et al., 2008; Hazan and Rahat, 2010). An 
interesting finding is that parties with highly inclusive candidate selection methods produce 
lists with lower levels of representation. Rahat et al. (2008) find that selection methods with 
membership ballots are less likely to produce candidate lists with women on safe positions. 
Highly exclusive methods, on the contrary, lead to highly representative sets of candidates. 
The underlying reason is the difference in the fundamental nature of the task confronting 
selectors in membership ballots vis-à-vis exclusive party committees. In membership ballots, 
on the one hand, members are asked after their individual preferences about party candidates. 
Selectors in party committees, on the other hand, are more inclined to base their decision on 
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an evaluation of the collective good of the party. In other words, these party committees are 
asked to construct a list of candidates that they think has the best chance of 1) maximizing the 
electoral result, and 2) keeping the intraparty turmoil to a minimum. In addition, membership 
ballots will also lead to unbalanced candidate lists because the actions of such a vast 
selectorate are more difficult to coordinate than the actions of party committees with a limited 
number of selectors. Following this argument, I formulate the following hypothesis: 
Exclusive candidate selection methods lead to more proportional and inclusive geographical 
representation on party lists (H3). 
An exclusive, non-selected party agency will produce a list of candidates from various areas 
within the district. This limited group of selectors will keep in mind the collective good of the 
party, which will then lead to geographically balanced candidate lists. A selection process 
where members are involved, by contrast, will be more likely to produce unbalanced lists.  
The link between territorial decentralization in candidate selection methods and the level of 
geographical representation on candidate lists appears more straightforward. According to 
Hazan and Rahat (2010), this relationship is positive because “if more power in the candidate 
selection process is given to the regional and/or the local selectorates, at the expense of the 
national party organization, the likely result will be more candidates chosen who represent 
the regional and local levels.” In other words, it is argued that candidates selected by a 
decentralized, regional or local selectorate, will be more geographically representative than a 
list of candidates selected by a national party selectorate. 
Decentralized candidate selection methods lead to more proportional and inclusive 
geographical representation on party lists (H4).  
4. The case of Belgium 
The Belgian electoral system is often characterized as a flexible list system, where voters are 
able to endorse a party list as a whole or to cast one or more preference votes for party 
candidates (Marsh 1985; Shugart 2005). In theory, both list order and the number of 
preference votes play an important role in the intraparty seat allocation. In practice, however, 
the threshold of preference votes to overcome the list order is reached very infrequently, 
which led scholars to characterize flexible list systems as closed-list systems in disguise (De 
Winter 2005, Crisp et al. 2013). In recent years, the Belgian system has experienced a number 
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of important electoral reforms that created variation in the key independent variables 
examined in this paper. 
4.1 District magnitude in Belgian Lower House elections 
First, district magnitude has increased substantially over the last two decades. As part of the 
fourth Belgian state reform in 1993, the number of electoral districts decreased from 30 to 20. 
This was a consequence of the decision to reduce the number of seats in the lower House from 
212 to 150. As a result, average district magnitude increased from 5 to 7.5. As part of an 
electoral reform in 2002, the number of districts decreased a second time from 20 to 11. More 
specifically, the sub-province districts were merged to provincial electoral districts.ii The 
number of electoral districts decreased to 11 constituencies, with an average size of 13.6. 
Table 1 presents a number of descriptive statistics on the evolution of district magnitude for 
the election of the Belgian lower House. 
Table 1. Characteristics of the Belgian electoral districts and lists for the election of the Lower House 
 Number 
of 
districts 
Number 
of seats 
Average 
DM 
Min. 
DM 
Max. 
DM 
Average 
list 
length 
Min. 
List 
length 
Max. 
list 
length 
1990-1991 30 212 5 2 18 12.2 6 39 
1995-1999 20 150 7.5 2 22 13.3 6 28 
2003-2010 11 150 13.6 4 24 22.3 10 37 
 
It is important to mention that the introduction of larger districts was accompanied by longer 
party lists. To some extent, this gave parties additional space to keep nominating candidates 
from both large and small municipalities. However, this should not be exaggerated: in both 
reforms the increase in the average list length was lower than the increase in the average 
district magnitude. In 1992, the average district magnitude increased by a ratio of 1.5 (7.5/5) 
and the average list length by a ratio of 1.1 (13.3/12.2). As a result, the net effect would still 
be a decrease in the number of candidates per seat. Figure 1 visualizes these reforms. While 
the majority of Belgian provinces were divided in relatively small districts before 1995, they 
have now become fairly large districts. 
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Figure 1: The electoral districts for the election of the Belgian Lower House before 1995 (left), in 1995 and 
1999 (middle), and in 2003, 2007 and 2010 (right). 
 
Some of the Belgian parties feared that the increase in district magnitude would make local 
ties completely irrelevant (Pilet, 2007). As elections would be organized on a higher scale, 
candidates from the largest cities would dominate election campaigns, making candidates 
from smaller municipalities invisible during election time. Moreover, these parties believed 
that the increase in district magnitude would actually lead to a centralization of intraparty 
decision-making procedures. The argument was based on the fact that candidate selection is 
often organized at the district level (Valen, 1988; Hix, 2004; Hazan and Rahat, 2010). This 
finding led some authors to assume that centralization tendencies in electoral systems would 
be followed by pressures for centralization in candidate selection processes (Czudnowski, 
1975; Epstein, 1980). However, it has never been demonstrated that the increase of district 
magnitude has a linear effect on the centralization level in candidate selection methods 
(Lundell, 2004; Hazan and Voerman, 2006; Shomer, 2012).  
4.2 Gender representation in Belgium 
A second relevant electoral reform in Belgium was the introduction of candidate gender 
quotas. The first Belgian quota law was introduced in 1994 and first applied in the 1999 
elections. It stated that no more than two thirds of the candidates on party lists could be of the 
same sex. In 2002, this law was adapted in the sense that party lists should from then on 
include an equal number of male and female candidates. In addition, at least one of the top 
three positions on the party list should be reserved for women. Right before the election of 
2007, this requirement was again adapted to at least one woman in the two top positions.  
The focus on list positions in the Belgian quota law can be explained by the importance of list 
order in the Belgian electoral system. Voters can either cast a vote at the top of the list, or a 
preference vote for one or more candidates on the same list. If candidates receive a specified 
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number of preference votes, they automatically get elected. Otherwise, the list votes are 
assigned to the highest ranked candidates until they reach the specified amount of votes 
needed for election. While the importance of list order has diminished over time (Wauters and 
Weekers, 2008), high ranks on the party list remain very important. 
After the introduction of candidate gender quotas, all Belgian parties were legally bounded to 
nominate a sufficient number of female candidates on their party lists, and afterwards even in 
the winning slots. This substantially increased both the number of female candidates on 
realistic list positions and the number of female MPs in the Lower House (from 7.7% in 1987 
to 38.5% in 2010). However, the proportion of female MPs has stagnated recently, and 
Belgian parties still vary considerably in their gender representation efforts on realistic list 
positions (Maddens et al., 2014).  
4.3 Candidate selection methods of Belgian parties 
In the majority of representative democracies, political parties use comparable candidate 
selection methods most of the time (Scarrow et al., 2002). According to Hazan and Voerman 
(2006), this lack of intra-country variation can be explained by shared norms within every 
political system that restrict the legitimate selection methods, and the imitation behaviour of 
parties towards one another. Belgian parties have also been copying each other’s methods to 
some extent, but there still has been some considerable variation in both the level of 
inclusiveness and centralization of their procedures. A possible explanation for Belgium being 
a deviating case is its peculiar situation with separate regional party systems for the Flemish 
and Walloon regions of the country. As a result, parties from different regions have not been 
in competition with each other for over 40 years, and each region developed its own party 
system with – at least partly – different political and party cultures. 
Various Belgian parties have employed highly inclusive selection methods over the last 
decades, allowing their members to participate in the process. The Flemish and Walloon 
Christian-Democrats, for example, have frequently been using a system of member polls: 
party members had the possibility to ratify or reject a model list drafted earlier by more 
exclusive party agencies (De Winter, 1988). Furthermore, the Flemish liberals introduced a 
highly inclusive system of primaries in the 1990s, which gave the opportunity to registered 
voters to nominate candidates for parliamentary elections (Verleden, 2013).  
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Other parties used methods working with party delegates. Since they are appointed by the 
members, these delegates can be seen as an indirect inclusion of party members in the 
selection process. The Flemish Socialists, for example, applied selection methods where the 
lists were ratified by an assembly of member delegates. But also the Flemish Christian-
Democrats used these assemblies for the first three elections included in the analysis 
(Deschouwer, 1993).  
Finally, there are also examples of highly exclusive selection methods, where no members of 
member delegates are involved in any way. On the contrary, these selection processes are 
completely dominated by non-selected party agencies. The Walloon liberal party MR is a 
good example of this category: only the presidents of the various party components were 
entitled to appoint the most important candidates on the party lists, and in a final step approve 
the entire candidate lists (Vandeleene et al., 2013). 
But also in terms of centralization, there was considerable variation among Belgian parties 
between 1987 and 2010. The Flemish liberal party, for example, has a strong tradition of 
keeping the role of the national party level very limited. One or two party agencies at the 
district level dominated their selection process during the entire period under investigation. In 
other cases, candidate lists are the result of an interaction between party agencies at the 
district and national party level. A typical example are the selection methods applied by the 
Flemish Christian-Democrats: after a party agency at the district level took the initiative of 
drafting a first list proposal, a national party agency could either modify or ratify this list, 
before it was presented to the members through a poll.  
Centralization was highest where the national party level had veto right in the final step of the 
selection process. In 2003 and 2007, the Walloon Christian-Democrats organized a candidate 
selection procedure where a national party committee with a limited number of members 
could approve the model list drafted by the district organization, or simply overrule the 
decisions made at the district level and draft a completely different proposal. 
5. Data, measurements and method 
I constructed a dataset on the place of residence of Belgian party candidates for all the 
elections of the Lower House since 1987.iii These data on candidates from 488 party lists was 
used to calculate the level of geographical representation on the lists. The dataset contains 
information on candidates from eight Belgian parties: the Christian-democrats, liberals, 
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socialists and green parties of the Walloon and Flemish regions of Belgium. The criterion for 
selecting these parties was their level of institutionalization and whether they have been 
represented continually in parliament.iv Furthermore, these parties submitted party lists in all 
districts during these elections, which indicates that they are parties with consolidated 
structures and high organizational complexity (Huntington, 1968).v  
5.1 Dependent variables: three indexes of geographical representation 
One of the key issues to deal with is of course how to measure the level of geographical 
representation on party lists. In fact, there are various conceptions of this outcome variable. 
First, a party list could be considered geographically representative when it includes 
candidates from the highest possible number of municipalities. The more municipalities are 
covered, the higher the proportion of voters in the district that is able to find candidates from 
the same municipality on the list. I measure this interpretation of geographical representation 
by means of municipality-index ܯ݅: 
ܯ݅ = 	 ௥ܰ
௧ܰ
 
where ௥ܰ is the number of municipalities represented on the party list, and ௧ܰ is the total 
number of municipalities in the district. Every municipality in the district gets a score of 1 or 
0, depending on the presence of at least one candidate from that municipality on the list. 
Subsequently, I aggregate the number of municipalities in the district with a score of 1, and 
divide this by the total number of municipalities in the district. Put differently, this index 
calculates the proportion of municipalities represented on the party lists. The higher the score, 
the higher the territorial coverage of the district in terms of party candidates. The higher the 
index score, the better a party scores on the municipality strategy-index.  
Second, a party list could also be considered geographically representative when its 
distribution of candidates over municipalities is in proportion to these municipalities’ 
population size. If a municipality accounts for over 50% of the entire population in a district, 
it should not come as a surprise that party selectorates will be inclined to nominate more than 
one candidate from there. Indeed, it could be perceived as geographically representative if the 
party selectorate would assign 50% of its list slots to candidates from this particular 
municipality. This second conception of geographical representation focuses on the 
proportional representation of the largest municipality in the district, and will be measured by 
population-index ௜ܲ: 
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௜ܲ = |ܺ௘ − ܺ௣| 
Where ܺ௘	is the expected number of candidates from the largest city in the electoral district, 
based on its relative population size. ܺ௣ is the actual number of candidates from the largest 
municipality in the district. A perfect proportional representation of the largest municipality 
would imply a score of 0, a higher score points to an over- or underrepresentation.  
These two measurements of geographical representation do not take into account list 
positions. Rank order remains an important determinant of the candidate’s odds of getting 
elected in the Belgian flexible list system. A difference might exist between the level of 
geographical representation on the party list in its entirety on the one hand, and the realistic 
places on the other. As a result, a third index focuses on the realistic list positions. More 
specifically, it measures the proportion of candidates of the largest municipality on the 
realistic list positions: 
ܴ௜ = 	 ܴ௟௠ܴ௡  
Where ܴ௟௠ is the number of candidates of the largest municipality on a realistic place, and ܴ௡ 
is the total number of realistic places on the party list. Of course, determining realistic list 
places is not always a straightforward endeavour. According to Hazan and Rahat (2010), 
whether or not list positions can be considered as realistic depends on the electoral system and 
party strength in the district. In closed list systems, it would suffice to measure the amount of 
seats the party expects to win in the district. If a party expects to win three seats, then the first 
three positions on the list should be considered realistic. In flexible list systems such as the 
Belgian case, this exercise is more complicated. 
In practice, Belgian party selectorates distinguish between realistic and non-realistic positions 
on the list, using previous election results as benchmarks (Put and Maddens, 2013). For 
example, if a party won three seats in a district during the previous election, the first four 
positions could be considered realistic: the candidate on the fourth positions stands a real 
chance of being elected on the condition that his or her number of preference votes is high 
enough and/or the party realizes a significant upward swing in the district. In addition, the 
Belgian case has known many examples of the candidate at the bottom of the list managing to 
get elected instead of a higher ranked candidate (Wauters et al., 2004). This is so because 
parties often choose popular politicians for this final position. For these reasons, the ‘list 
pusher’ will also be considered a realistic position in the analysis. Finally, a particularity of 
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the Belgian system is that voters are presented with a list of effective as well as substitute 
candidates. These substitutes for the elected MPs are also rank ordered on the basis of their 
preference votes, after the distribution of list votes. If an MP becomes member of 
government, resigns or dies, he or she will be replaced by the first substitute. Therefore the 
first substitute is also included in the category of realistic list positions. 
These three indexes all have in common that they focus on the municipality level as the 
relevant geographical unit, and this for two substantial reasons. First, the municipality level is 
the lowest organizational unit within Belgian political parties and could still be seen as 
building stones of their party organizations (Deschouwer and Rihoux, 2008). They perform 
the crucial task of recruiting talented aspirant-candidates. The other subnational levels, on the 
contrary, are more important in terms of communication and linkage between the national and 
municipal level. Second, politicians’ local ties are usually defined in terms of previous 
political experience at the municipal level (Tavits, 2009; Tavits, 2010; Put and Maddens, 
forthcoming). 
5.2 Independent variables 
District magnitude (DM) is measured by the number of seats per district. While this 
operationalization is common practice in the majority of studies using DM as independent 
variable, I will also control for the number of list positions available per municipality in the 
district. This ratio summarizes the scarcity of list places and level of competition that exists 
among the various municipalities in the district.  
The level of gender representation on party lists is measured by the proportion of female 
candidates on realistic list positions. As a result of the introduction of quota laws, this 
proportion will generally increase over the seven Lower House elections under investigation. 
However, by using this measure, I control for substantial differences between parties within 
elections. For example, while parties were not legally required to nominate 50% of female 
candidates before 2003, the Flemish green party already reached this threshold in 1995 
(Maddens et al., 2014).  
To estimate the effect of intraparty candidate selection methods, I work with selection indexes 
measuring the dimensions of inclusiveness and decentralization on an ordinal scale. While 
Shomer (2009, 2012) introduced an integrated 6-point scale, I use two separate scales to test 
the distinct effects of inclusiveness and decentralization on the response variables. 
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The level of inclusiveness of Belgian candidate selection methods is measured on a 3-point 
scale. The highest level on this scale are selection methods where members are directly 
involved, for example by ratifying the model lists that have been drafted by one of the party 
agencies. The middle category on this scale are the selection methods where party members 
appoint delegates. The most exclusive category are procedures where members or delegates 
are not involved in any way, but one or more non-selected party agencies dominate the 
selection process. 
 
I constructed a similar 3-point scale for measuring the level of decentralization, the second 
candidate selection dimension included in this study. The highest score on the scale is for the 
selection methods where the constituency organization has full autonomy in drafting the lists. 
If, however, the selection process takes the form of an interaction between the national and 
district level, the observation fits the second category on the index. The most centralized 
procedure is when the national party level controls the final step of the selection process 
and/or has the chance to overrule any previous decisions taken at a lower party level.  
Finally, the number of realistic list places will also be added as a control variable to the three 
multivariate analyses. This will be measured in relative terms, i.e. the proportion of list places 
that can be considered realistic on the party list. 
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5.3 Method 
The second dependent variable ( ௜ܲ) measures the degree of proportionality in the 
representation of the largest municipality in the district, and can be considered a continuous 
dependent variable. To test the effect of the earlier mentioned independent variables on ௜ܲ, I 
use multiple OLS regression analysis. 
The first and third dependent variable (ܯ݅ and	ܴ௜), however, are proportions: Mi measures the 
proportion of municipalities that are represented on the candidate list, and R measures the 
proportion of realistic candidates that lives in the largest municipality of the district. If the 
dependent variable is a proportion, both the assumptions of continuous scores and normality 
are violated. The classical solution to this problem is to perform a logit transformation to 
achieve normality, followed by multiple OLS regression. The following transformation is 
applied:vi	 
ܮ݋݃݅ݐ	(ܴ݅) = 	 ln( ܴ݅1 − ܴ݅) 
6. Multivariate analyses 
In this section, I discuss the results of three OLS regression analyses with ௜ܲ, ܯ݅ and ܴ௜ as 
dependent variables.vii Table 2 presents the OLS regression coefficients of these three models.  
Model 1 deals with ௜ܲ, the degree of proportionality in the representation of the largest 
municipality in the district. The results show that, first of all, district magnitude has a positive 
impact on this response variable. In larger districts, it appears more difficult to realize a 
proportional representation of the largest municipality than in smaller districts. In other 
words, an increase in DM seems to lead to a less proportional representation of the most 
sizeable city of the electoral district. 
Gender representation, in terms of the number of women on realistic list positions, and the 
level of decentralization in the candidate selection method do not make a difference in the 
party list score on this index. With regard to the inclusiveness of the selectorate, however, 
there is only one category on the scale which has a negative impact on ௜ܲ: selection processes 
with member delegates lead to a more proportional representation of large municipalities. 
  
17 
 
Table 2. Determinants of geographical representation on party lists: OLS regression models 
Variable Model 1 Pi 
 
Model 2 
Mi 
 
Model 3 
Ri 
 
Constant -0.21 
(0.24)  
-1.94 
(0.03) 
*** 
 
-3.60 
(0.32) 
*** 
 
District magnitude 0.08 
(0.01) 
*** 
 
0.00 
(0.00) 
 
 
0.05 
(0.01) 
*** 
 
Gender representation -0.22 
(0.22)  
-0.03 
(0.03) 
 
 
-0.37 
(0.23)  
Decentralization (ref.= district level) 
 
Interaction national/district level 
 
National level veto/dominance 
 
 
0.16 
(0.11) 
0.11 
(0.14)  
 
 
-0.03 
(0.01) 
-0.06 
(0.02) 
 
 
* 
 
** 
 
 
 
-0.07 
(0.15) 
-0.17 
(0.19)  
Inclusiveness (ref.= non-party agencies) 
 
Member delegates 
 
Members 
 
 
-0.43 
(0.12) 
-0.08 
(0.14) 
*** 
 
 
 
0.05 
(0.02) 
0.05 
(0.02) 
 
 
** 
 
** 
 
 
 
0.41 
(0.16) 
0.18 
(0.19) 
* 
 
Proportion realistic list positions 0.35 
(0.49)  
0.11 
(0.07) 
 
 
-0.70 
(0.67)  
Average number of list positions per municipality 1.24 
(0.18) 
*** 
 
0.67 
(0.02) 
*** 
 
1.31 
(0.24) 
*** 
 
Adjusted R² .21  .67  .11  
Notes: OLS estimates are shown. Standard errors between brackets. *: p<0,05; **: p<0,01; ***: p<0,001 
The average number of list places per municipality strongly increases the value of ௜ܲ. This 
indicates that, the more space available on party lists, the more parties will be able to present a 
list where the largest municipality is proportionally represented. This is also the case for the 
second and third response variable: more candidate list slots generally increases the 
proportionality and inclusiveness of party lists, which is not a surprising finding. 
The results for response variable ܯ݅, which measures the proportion of municipalities 
represented on party lists, are completely different (Model 2). This model explains as much as 
67% of the variation in ܯ݅. Both candidate selection dimensions appear strong predictors. 
Concerning decentralization, the data show that the more decentralized the selection process, 
the higher the proportion of represented municipalities on the party list. For candidate lists 
where the national party level dominates the selection process, ܯ݅ is significantly lower than 
on party lists where the district level is (partially) involved. This confirms the expectations 
formulated in hypothesis H4.   
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But also the inclusiveness of the selectorate appears to have a significant impact on	ܯ݅. More 
specifically, more inclusive selection methods lead to inclusive geographic representation on 
party lists: there are more municipalities represented on the list if members and delegates 
were involved in the candidate selection process. This finding is at odds with hypothesis H3 
that exclusive selection methods draft more inclusive party lists (H3).  
The third and final dependent variable ܴ݅ focuses on realistic list positions, and measures the 
proportion of these positions assigned to candidates living in the largest municipality of the 
district. The results suggest that district magnitude has a significantly positive effect on ܴ݅, 
which was also the case in Model 1 (See Table 2). In other words, the largest cities are the 
most dominant on realistic positions in the largest electoral districts. In addition, the candidate 
selection processes with member delegates are the only category making a significant impact 
(P<0.05): when member delegates are involved, the proportion of realistic places assigned to 
large cities is significantly higher than in other selection methods.  
7. Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to provide more insight into the geographical consequences of 
intraparty candidate selection processes. Based on the relevant literature, I selected a number 
of independent variables which were expected to have an impact on geographical 
representation, measured in three different ways. 
Some of the results were not particularly surprising. For example, the fact that higher numbers 
of list positions per municipality increases both the proportionality and inclusive nature of 
party lists, is self-evident. The more places on the list, the more the parties can take into 
account important balances for organizational and electoral purposes. Additionally, the 
finding that more decentralized candidate selection processes lead to more inclusive candidate 
lists in terms of municipalities covered on the list, is in line with hypothesis H4. 
Decentralization does not, however, lead to more proportional party lists or an increase of 
large municipality candidates on realistic list positions.  
A more peculiar finding, however, is the effect of the inclusiveness of the selectorate 
(hypothesis H3). The more popular claim in the literature that exclusive party selectorates are 
the best choice for levels of representation (Rahat et al., 2008), is not confirmed by the data 
on the Belgian case. Instead, the involvement of members or member delegates increases the 
representation of geographic minorities on party lists. In sum, it appears that highly 
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decentralized and inclusive candidate selection methods are the most advantageous choice for 
candidates from small municipalities. 
I also found that the level of geographical representation, whichever way it is operationalized, 
does not correlate with the level of gender representation on party lists. This implies that the 
data do not support the claim that the level of one form of representation is a good indicator of 
levels of representation in the other (hypothesis H2a). Nor does the data confirm the 
alternative hypothesis (H2b) that one form of representation goes at the expense of the other. 
As a consequence, the introduction of gender quota did not bring about a substantial decrease 
in other forms of representation. 
Finally, district magnitude improves proportionality in the number of largest municipality 
candidates, and at the same time increases the number of those candidates on realistic 
positions. These findings suggest that an electoral district reform, which results in higher 
district magnitude, leads to more proportional geographical representation on party lists, but 
not necessarily more inclusive geographical representation. The latter strongly depends on the 
number of list positions per municipality. In other words, if a district reform takes place, 
policy makers should accompany the reform by substantially extending the number of list 
positions. Otherwise, geographic minority groups will be left behind during the nomination 
process. 
While Belgium is of course a case with notoriously complex territorial and electoral 
dynamics, I believe that the results of these analyses can, to a certain extent, be generalized to 
comparable flexible list systems. More specifically, the variation in district magnitude and 
candidate selection methods of Belgian parties has been quite substantial over the last 25 
years. This makes Belgium the ideal empirical testing ground for some of the hypotheses 
concerning the effects of electoral system attributes on party list representation. However, it is 
generally accepted in the specialized literature that candidate selection dynamics and the 
effects of district magnitude on party- and candidate behavior strongly differ according to 
electoral system type. This creates the need for a more comparative approach in future 
research, where both closed and open list systems are added to the analysis as well. 
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NOTES 
                                                             
i While Hazan and Rahat (2001) discuss both territorial and functional decentralization, I only focus on 
territorial decentralization in this paper. 
ii The only exception was the bilingual electoral district of Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde, for which the 
federal government failed to work out an acceptable solution for the involved language groups and the 
constitutional court. 
iii Candidates for the Lower House do not have to live in the electoral district where they will be 
running for election. In fact, if they are registered in any Belgian municipality on election day at the 
latest, the party selectorate can use them in any district they want. 
iv The only exception are the Flemish greens, who have been out of the Federal Parliament for one 
legislative term (2003-2007).  
v While the radical right party Vlaams Blok/Belang does meet these criteria, they were left out of the 
analysis because there is no Walloon counterpart available. 
vi However, this solution is still problematic if some of the observations in the dependent variable 
equal 0 or 1. The logit transformation for these observations will yield undefined values, resulting in 
missing values and consequently a loss of information. To avoid this, I will slightly adjust the data to 
ensure that 0 < ܴ௜ (or ܯ݅) < 1, and every observation will be included in the multivariate analyses. The 
adjusted transformation then looks like this: 
݈݋݃݅ݐ	(ܴ௜) = 	 ln( ܴ௜ + 0.011 − ܴ௜ − 0.01) 
vii The regression coefficients should be interpreted with some caution: since I used a logit 
transformation of ܴ௜ and ܯ݅, the resulting coefficients should be interpreted on the logarithmic scale. 
Although it is possible to back-transform an estimated probability on the logit scale to the probability 
scale, it is not possible to back-transform a regression parameter estimate to the probability scale. 
